Welcome to The Long Run

On behalf of the Economic History Society (EHS), it is a pleasure to welcome you to The Long Run, the EHS blog.

This blog aims to encourage discussion of economic and social history, broadly defined. We live in a time of major social and economic change, and recent research in social science is showing more and more how much a historical and long-term approach to current issues can be the key to understanding our times. The importance of bringing together the disciplines that compose what we call social sciences and have them interact in a historical perspective is absolutely fundamental not only for the future directions of economic history, but also to be able to reflect on the mechanisms that regulate our world through data and knowledge.

The Long Run aims to host senior scholars as well as young researchers, and anyone who has interesting and scientifically sound contributions to make to Economic and Social History. The blog will also be a way for EHS members and anyone interested in the activities of the Society to keep updated on its activities, from our Review to CFPs and other activities that you can find on our website

We welcome any contribution or suggestion – please contact us at ehs.thelongrun@gmail.com

or take a look at our CFP here

It is appropriate to record my appreciation for Professor Peter Fearon, outgoing Chair of the EHS Public Engagement committee, who originally conceived the idea for the blog. A special thanks also to our editorial team: Marta Musso, Bernardo Bátiz-Lazo, Amy Ridgway, Judy Stephenson and Romesh Vaitilingam, without whom this blog would not exist. Special thanks are due to Marta who did much of the ‘heavy lifting’.

We look forward to seeing you here regularly, always standing on the shoulders of giants.

Professor David Higgins (EHS Public Engagement Committee)

13 June 2016

From NEP-HIS Blog: ‘The market turn: From social democracy to market liberalism’, by Avner Offer

The market turn: From social democracy to market liberalism By Avner Offer, All Souls College, University of Oxford (avner.offer@all-souls.ox.ac.uk) Abstract: Social democracy and market liberalism offered different solutions to the same problem: how to provide for life-cycle dependency. Social democracy makes lateral transfers from producers to dependents by means of progressive taxation. Market liberalism uses […]

via How do we eliminate wealth inequality and financial fragility? — The NEP-HIS Blog

From VOX – Short poppies: the height of WWI servicemen

From Timothy Hatton, Professor of Economics, Australian National University and University of Essex. Originally published on 9 May 2014

The height of today’s populations cannot explain which factors matter for long-run trends in health and height. This column highlights the correlates of height in the past using a sample of British army soldiers from World War I. While the socioeconomic status of the household mattered, the local disease environment mattered even more. Better education and modest medical advances led to an improvement in average health, despite the war and depression.

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Distribution of heights in a sample of army recruits. From Bailey et al. (2014)

The last century has seen unprecedented increases in the heights of adults (Bleakley et al., 2013). Among young men in western Europe, that increase amounts to about four inches. On average, sons have been taller than their fathers for the last five generations. These gains in height are linked to improvements in health and longevity.

Increases in human stature have been associated with a wide range of improvements in living conditions, including better nutrition, a lower disease burden, and some modest improvement in medicine. But looking at the heights of today’s populations provides limited evidence on the socioeconomic determinants that can account for long-run trends in health and height. For that, we need to understand the correlates of height in the past. Instead of asking why people are so tall now, we should be asking why they were so short a century ago.

In a recent study Roy Bailey, Kris Inwood and I ( Bailey et al. 2014) took a sample of soldiers joining the British army around the time of World War I. These are randomly selected from a vast archive of two million service records that have been made available by the National Archives, mainly for the benefit of genealogists searching for their ancestors.

For this study, we draw a sample of servicemen who were born in the 1890s and who would therefore be in their late teens or early twenties when they enlisted. About two thirds of this cohort enlisted in the armed services and so the sample suffers much less from selection bias than would be likely during peacetime, when only a small fraction joined the forces. But we do not include officers who were taller than those they commanded. And at the other end of the distribution, we also miss some of the least fit, who were likely to be shorter than average.

FULL TEXT HERE

WELFARE SPENDING DOESN’T ‘CROWD OUT’ CHARITABLE WORK: Historical evidence from England under the Poor Laws

Cutting the welfare budget is unlikely to lead to an increase in private voluntary work and charitable giving, according to research by Nina Boberg-Fazlic and Paul Sharp.

Their study of England in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, published in the February 2017 issue of the Economic Journal, shows that parts of the country where there was increased spending under the Poor Laws actually enjoyed higher levels of charitable income.

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Edmé Jean Pigal, 1800 ca. An amputee beggar holds out his hat to a well dressed man who is standing with his hands in his pockets. Artist’s caption’s translation: “I don’t give to idlers”. From Wikimedia Commons

 

 

The authors conclude:

‘Since the end of the Second World War, the size and scope of government welfare provision has come increasingly under attack.’

‘There are theoretical justifications for this, but we believe that the idea of ‘crowding out’ – public spending deterring private efforts – should not be one of them.’

‘On the contrary, there even seems to be evidence that government can set an example for private donors.

Why does Europe have considerably higher welfare provision than the United States? One long debated explanation is the existence of a ‘crowding out’ effect, whereby government spending crowds out private voluntary work and charitable giving. The idea is that taxpayers feel that they are already contributing through their taxes and thus do not contribute as much privately.

Crowding out makes intuitive sense if people are only concerned with the total level of welfare provided. But many other factors might play a role in the decision to donate privately and, in fact, studies on this topic have led to inconclusive results.

The idea of crowding out has also caught the imagination of politicians, most recently as part of the flagship policy of the UK’s Conservative Party in the 2010 General Election: the so-called ‘big society’. If crowding out holds, spending cuts could be justified by the notion that the private sector will take over.

The new study shows that this is not necessarily the case. In fact, the authors provide historical evidence for the opposite. They analyse data on per capita charitable income and public welfare spending in England between 1785 and 1815. This was a time when welfare spending was regulated locally under the Poor Laws, which meant that different areas in England had different levels of spending and generosity in terms of who received how much relief for how long.

The research finds no evidence of crowding out; rather, it finds that parts of the country with higher state provision of welfare actually enjoyed higher levels of charitable income. At the time, Poor Law spending was increasing rapidly, largely due to strains caused by the Industrial Revolution. This increase occurred despite there being no changes in the laws regulating relief during this period.

The increase in Poor Law spending led to concerns among contemporary commentators and economists. Many expressed the belief that the increase in spending was due to a disincentive effect of poor relief and that mandatory contributions through the poor rate would crowd out voluntary giving, thereby undermining social virtue. That public debate now largely repeats itself two hundred years later.

 

Summary of the article ‘Does Welfare Spending Crowd Out Charitable Activity? Evidence from Historical England under the Poor Laws’ by Nina Boberg-Fazlic (University of Duisberg-Essen) and Paul Sharp (University of Southern Denmark). Published in  Economic Journal, February 2017

From The Conversation: No, the Black Death did not create more jobs for women

by Jane Humphries, Professor of Economic History, University of Oxford
Published on 8 April 2014

The plague known as the Black Death which tore through 14th century Europe is traditionally held to have had at least one upside. Women, the theory runs, were able to exploit the labour shortages of post-plague England to find themselves in a richer and more stable position than before. However the idea that women of the era were forerunners of the post World War I generation doesn’t stand up to much scrutiny, as new research shows.

Medievalists have long debated the extent to which women shared in the “golden age” of the English peasantry that followed the demographic catastrophe of the Black Death. The plague killed between 30% and 45% of the population in its first wave 1348-59. Recurrences meant that by the 1370s England’s population had been halved.

The silver lining, for the peasantry at least, was the dramatic increase in workers’ remuneration as landowners struggled to recruit and retain labourers. The results are apparent in a rapid increase in male casual (nominal and real) wages from about 1349.

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Some historians have argued that women’s gains were even more marked as they could find employment in hitherto male-dominated jobs, or migrate to towns to work in the growing textile industries and commercial services and so enjoy “economic independence”.

Others however have suggested that whatever the implications of the Black Death for male workers, the sexual division of labour prevented women from seizing the opportunities created by the labour shortage. As one account puts it: “Women tended to work in low-skilled, low-paid jobs … This was true in 1300 and it remained true in 1700”.

The debate has significant implications as optimists have gone further in arguing that women’s improved wages changed demographic behaviour by delaying marriage, promoting celibacy and reducing fertility, with the resulting so-called north-west European Marriage Pattern raising incomes and promoting further growth.

READ FULL ARTICLE HERE

 

France’s Nineteenth Century Wine Crisis: the impact on crime rates

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Street Wine Merchant, France 19th century. From Wikimedia Commons

 

The phylloxera crisis in nineteenth century France destroyed 40% of the country’s vineyards, devastating local economies. According to research by Vincent Bignon, Eve Caroli, and Roberto Galbiati, the negative shock to wine production led to a substantial increase in property crime in the affected regions. But their study, published in the February 2017 issue of the Economic Journal, also finds that there was a significant fall in violent crimes because of the reduction in alcohol consumption.

It has long been debated whether crime responds to economic conditions. In particular, do crime rates increase because of financial crises or major downsizing events in regions heavily specialised in some industries?

Casual observation and statistical evidence suggest that property crimes are more frequent during economic crises. For example, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has claimed that in a sample of 15 countries, theft has sharply increased during the last economic crisis.[1]

These issues are important because crime is also known to have a damaging impact on economic growth by discouraging business and talented workers from settling in regions with high rates of crime. If an economic downturn triggers an increase in the crime rate, it could have long-lasting effects by discouraging recovery.

But since multiple factors can simultaneously affect economic conditions and the propensity to commit crime, identifying a causal effect of economic conditions on crime rates is challenging.

The new research addresses the issue by examining how crime rates were affected by a major economic crisis that massively hit wine production, France’s most iconic industry, in the nineteenth century.

The crisis was triggered by the near microscopic insect named phylloxera vastatrix. It originally lived in North America and did not reach Europe in the era of sailing ships since the transatlantic journey took so long that it had died on arrival.

Steam power provided the greater speed needed for phylloxera to survive the trip and it arrived in France in 1863 on imported US vines. Innocuous in its original ecology, phylloxera proved very destructive for French vineyards by sucking the sap of the vines. Between 1863 and 1890, it destroyed about 40% of them, thus causing a significant loss of GDP.

Because phylloxera took time to spread, not all districts started being hit at the same moment, and because districts differed widely in their ability to grow wines, not all districts were hit equally. The phylloxera crisis is therefore an ideal natural experiment to identify the impact of an economic crisis on crime because it generated exogenous variation in economic activity in 75 French districts.

To show the effect quantitatively, the researchers have collected local administrative data on the evolution of property and violent crime rates, as well as minor offences. They use these data to study whether crime increased significantly after the arrival of phylloxera and the ensuing destruction of the vineyards that it entailed.

The results suggest that the phylloxera crisis caused a substantial increase in property crime rates and a significant decrease in violent crimes. The effect on property crime was driven by the negative income shock induced by the crisis. People coped with the negative income shock by engaging in property crimes. At the same time, the reduction in alcohol consumption induced by the phylloxera crisis had a positive effect on the reduction of violent crimes.

From a policy point of view, these results suggest that crises and downsizing events can have long lasting effects. By showing that the near-disappearance of an industry (in this case only a temporary phenomenon) can trigger long-run negative consequences on local districts through an increasing crime rate, this study underlines that this issue must be high on the policy agenda at times of crises.

 

Summary of the article ‘Stealing to Survive? Crime and Income Shocks in Nineteenth Century France’ by Vincent Bignon, Eve Caroli and Roberto Galbiati. Published in Economic Journal on February 2017

[1] ‘Monitoring the impact of economic crisis on crime’, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012. This effect was also noted by the French ‘Observatoire national de la délinquance et des réponses pénales’, when it underlines that burglaries sharply increased in France in the period 2007 to 2012.

From Notes on Liberty – Ten best papers/books in economic history of the last decades (part 1)

In my post on French economic history last week, I claimed that Robert Allen’s 2001 paper in Explorations in Economic History was one of the ten most important papers of the last twenty-five years. In reaction, economic historian Benjamin Guilbert asked me “what are the other nine”? As I started thinking about the best articles, I realized that […]

via Ten best papers/books in economic history of the last decades (part 1) — Notes On Liberty

From the LSE blogs – Industrial strategy: some lessons from the past

Industrial strategy is back on the government’s agenda, with a promise to produce a ‘match fit’ economy that ‘works for everyone’ and is able to thrive after Brexit. As yet, however, there is little sign of the promised broadly-based and coherent industrial strategy emerging. In crafting it, explains Hugh Pemberton, its architects may profitably look…

via Industrial strategy: some lessons from the past — British Politics and Policy at LSE

From VOX – free ebook download – The Long Economic and Political Shadow of History, Volume 1

Over the past decades, economists working on growth have ‘rediscovered’ the importance of history, leading to the emergence of a vibrant, far-reaching inter-disciplinary stream of work. This column introduces a new eBook in three volumes which examines key themes in this emergent literature and discusses the impact they have on our understanding of the long-run…

via New eBook: The Long Economic and Political Shadow of History — VoxEU.org: Recent Articles

Political Institutions Shaping Economic Outcomes: Land Tenures in Colonial Sind 1843-1920

by Tehreem Husain

Interactions of political and economic institutions and their ramifications on development outcomes have been recognised by academics and policymakers alike. This blog analyzes the principal-agent relation between the British coloniser and local landlords and peasants in British Sind during 1843-1920. It argues that changes in political institutions during the period affected economic institutions, which through path dependence persists today.

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Research in the area of comparative institutions and economic development points to the fact that political institutions once in place, persist and shape the political-economic interactions between different groups and agents. Moreover, past institutional frameworks also have a degree of influence on the direction that institutional change takes place (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). This has been the case in British Sind (part of Bombay Presidency till 1935) as well. Sind’s primarily agrarian societal structure was based in powerful landlords who held large tracts of land with peasants having little or negligible ownership rights. The institution of land tenures – a term which encompasses rights of land occupancy, land revenue collection and land ownership – did not only impact agricultural productivity and welfare outcomes during the period under study but can still be felt today.

Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson’s seminal paper on institutions (2005) has highlighted the instrumental role that land tenures and property rights play in determining social outcomes and trajectory of economic growth of a group, region or a nation. This is applicable to British Sind too. During 1843-1920 system and laws regarding land revenue and tenures were taking roots in the region. Overall, three different forms of land tenure systems were introduced in India; landlord-based system (zamindari), an individual cultivator based system (ryotwari), and a village-based system (mahalwari). Selection of a system was mainly defined by the actual or prospective land revenue from an area. The importance of choosing a specific land tenure system and hence extraction of land revenue from a region can be gauged from the fact that by the mid-nineteenth century land revenue contributed more than 50 percent and even seventy years later by 1920 more than 40 percent to the total revenue of British India.

In ensuring smooth collection of land revenue, the governance structure adopted by the British aligned itself to the indigenous societal structure using the local landlords as ‘intermediaries’, usually those who had ‘traditional’ or ‘customary’ authority. The colonial state maintained de jure ‘direct rule’ over the territory however in reality coercion was enforced by intermediate local political elites who operated outside the bureaucratic-rational apparatus of the state (Naseemullah and Staniland, 2014). The local landlord was made powerful firstly by granting them revenue-free lands which were heritable, and secondly, by giving them powers to collect revenue. This was done in exchange of curtailing any political and social resistance against the British. On the other hand, unlike in other parts of India where agricultural tenants had occupancy rights (Swamy, 2011), tenants in Sind would till the land and meet conditions that the landlords may impose on them from time to time without any land-ownership (Hughes, 1876).

Granting local landlords rent free lands and special privileges of land revenue collection fortified the extant hierarchical societal structure and was broadly aimed at establishing and perpetuating British rule through the institution of land tenures. Land revenue and administration records exhibit that 19.5% of land amongst large tracts of land (500 acres or more) had rent-free status in Sind-the highest in the entire Bombay Presidency. Moreover, legislative acts were also passed during this period to ensure that the power and influence the landlords wielded was not undermined.

Interestingly, upon Sind’s annexation to the empire in 1843, the British desired to deal directly with the cultivator and implemented the ryotwari system of land tenures. However, they soon realized the local landlords were wielding enormous authority over the peasants living with little or no land rights. Hence ryotwari system converged closely to a zamindari system; though official records continued to recognize it as the former. Consequently, the utilitarian nature of ryotwari system was destroyed by trading rights of the peasants for achieving political gains.

The approach of granting rent free lands and closely following the zamindari system of land tenures was at odds with the colonial power’s fiscal target of improving public finances from this area for the larger aim of achieving political expediency. The fact that a significant portion (87 percent) of revenue was alienated in Sind relative to rest of Bombay Presidency is evidence of this claim. Moreover, it also impacted agricultural productivity. This can be ascertained from the fact that alienated land had the lowest yield. Colonial records also give evidence to the claim that revenue per acre from alienated land was quite low in Sind and was falling. More importantly, incidence of revenue in non-alienated land was highest in Sind. This shows that the incidence of revenue was primarily on tenants and on small landlords. As much as the analysis of historical land tenure systems in Sind gives insight on how economic institutions were influenced and shaped it also serves as a social premise on Sindi society which to this day has largely been unchanged relative to what it was more than 150 years ago.

Furthermore, comparison of land revenue and administration records from Sind to rest of the Bombay Presidency suggests that the land grants to the landlords in Sind were very pronounced relative to other districts in the Presidency. Overall, analysis of land revenue and administration records from 1843-1920 highlight three aspects of economic history of Bombay Presidency in British India.

First, it argues that the, like in other parts of the colony, British colonizers exploited agency relation to govern Sind and used local landlords as their agents. The interesting part is that they built principle-agent relation by first confiscating the whole area and then making grants of large tracts of heritable rent­-free land to the old rulers and landlords. These land grants were the highest in Sind compared to rest of the Bombay Presidency and reinforced the existing social order through land tenure system. Primary purpose of this approach was to ensure smooth governance in the province.

Second, using land tenures as an instrument to achieve political expediency, they implemented ryotwari land tenure system on paper which, however, in spirit, was more like the zamindari system. This has implications for earlier work on historical land tenures in India (for instance Banerjee, 1985) wherein official records on land tenures have been considered as the practiced one. This needs to be tested for other parts of British India. This impacted agricultural productivity and revenue outcomes.

Third, although land granted as jagirs, inam etc. was done elsewhere in the Bombay Presidency (of which Sind was a part till 1935), this article argues that this was carried out in the harshest form in Sind where the tenant had no occupancy rights unlike elsewhere in the Bombay Presidency. The impact of this was reflected in low agricultural yields from alienated land in Sind relative to the same category elsewhere in the Bombay Presidency. Moreover, these effects are still being felt today and these institutions have permeated through time and shown path dependence. Researchers using data from the latest agricultural census of Pakistan 2010 have shown that inequality in terms of land ownership has increased through time in Sind.

From Bradley A. Hansen’s Blog – Economic History in 2016

We are now fully in 2017 – Bradley A. Hansen, Professor of Economics and American Studies at University of Mary Washington, helps us revise what happened and what was published in the discipline.

by Bradley A. Hansen
Originally published on 30 December 2016

Measuring Long Run Economic Performance
One of the most significant developments in economic history over the last several decades has been the work to improve our estimates of long run economic performance. Responding to challenges presented by Pomeranz’s Great Divergence and obvious weaknesses in Madison’s estimates, a number of economic historians have worked to develop better estimates of economic performance in Europe and Asia over the very long run. Economic historians continue these efforts but also recognize the limitations of what they have done and, possibly, what they can do.

Stephen Broadberry has done much of this work…

Full Article HERE