The Economic History Society is very happy to launch its new website as of November 2020.
This site streamlines everything that the Society has to offer, including events and registration for the Annual Conference, and member-only access to the Economic History Review, grant and bursary applications for students and ECRs, and a growing repository of resources in economic and social history.
The Long Run will now be hosted on the new EHS website. Read past and new blogs here.
Country risk includes, ‘any macroeconomic, microeconomic, financial, social, political, institutional, judiciary, climatic, technological, or sanitary risk that affects (or could affect) an investor in a foreign country. Damages may materialize in several ways: financial losses; threat to the safety of the investing company’s employees, clients, or consumers; reputational damage, or loss of a market or supply source’ (Gaillard 2020).
Although it was not until the mid-1970s that the concept of country risk began to permeate the economic literature and media, the obstacles listed above have challenged international investors for many years.
One of the most important threats was certainly expropriation (or nationalization) risk, which materialized dramatically with the advent of WWI. In the first weeks of war, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Russia enacted legislation that prohibited trade with the enemy and sanctioned the confiscation and even liquidation of the businesses owned by enemy aliens located on their territory (Caglioti 2014). In doing so, combatant nations violated the principle of ‘immunity of private enemy property’ established by the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.
The most striking nationalization episode followed the Soviet Revolution of 1917, when the communists seized all property belonging to foreigners. Other significant expropriations occurred in Bolivia and Mexico in 1937 and 1938, respectively; they affected American and British oil companies (Maurer 2013).
World War II led to the widespread confiscation of enemy assets, which further undermined the sanctity of foreign private property. During the Cold War, expropriation risk remained a major concern among international investors (Figure 1). Nationalizations were driven by three factors: interventionist or even socialist policies, the extensive interpretation of every State’s right to exploit its natural resources and, finally, idiosyncratic political motives (e.g., Iran in 1951 and 1979–1980; Indonesia in the early 1960s).
How can we explain the spectacular fall in the number of expropriation acts observed in the 1980s and 1990s? In fact, the debt crisis of the 1980s obliged most developing and emerging countries to adopt market-friendly policies (for example, legal security for property rights, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and the liberalization of trade and finance). These policies were soon encapsulated in the term ‘Washington Consensus (Williamson 1990).
Nationalization risk was crucial in the history of country risk. The expropriation acts announced by Fidel Castro in 1959–1960 served as a catalyst and led to the development of political risk and country risk assessment tools.
In my book, I identify several generations of indicators. The first generation includes the risk indicators developed in the 1960s by consulting firms, such as Business International and Business Environmental Risk Index (BERI). The second generation is composed of the external country risk assessors that emerged shortly before the globalization years – namely, Euromoney and International Country Risk Guide. The third generation is represented by export credit agencies. The fourth generation comprises what I call ‘neoliberal indicators’. Launched in the mid-1990s, the indices of the Heritage Foundation and the Fraser Institute put considerable emphasis on economic freedom. The fifth generation, which gained influence in the 2000s, scrutinizes competitiveness; the Global Competitiveness Reports published by the World Economic Forum are emblematic of this last generation.
I analyse how well these risk indicators anticipated eight types of shocks: major episodes of international political violence, major episodes of domestic political violence, expropriation acts, high-inflation peaks, deep economic depressions, significant restrictions on capital flows, sovereign debt crises, and exceptional natural disasters. The accuracy of these ratings reveals some performance gaps. Euromoney and the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) outperform their counterparts. Euromoney’s ‘risk-free’ rating category and the GCI’s top-ranked group (that is, the top 25 per cent) are especially reliable. The Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World index is less accurate than other indicators owing to the high proportion of ‘crisis countries’ in its top ratings and rankings.
by Sibylle Lehmann-Hasemeyer and Fabian Wahl (University of Hohenheim)
The full blog post from this article was published on The Economic History Review and is now available on early view at this link
The German banking system is often considered a key factor in German industrialisation. For Alexander Gerschenkron, Germany’s experience can serve as a role model for other moderately backward economies: governments could trigger economic development by supporting the establishment of modern financial institutions such as universal banks, which were typical of the German banking system and which mobilised savings, reduced risks for investors, and improved the allocation of resources. Such activities ease the trading of goods and services and foster technological innovation.
Scholarly discussion on the banking-growth nexus in Germany has focused on universal banks without giving significant attention to other forms of banking. It is surprising that earlier research has ascribed savings banks a limited role in industrialization: by 1913, they held 24.8 per cent of the total assets of all German financial institutions and ranked first among all bank types for net investment. Moreover, savings banks had the advantage of being public institutions. Because they were not profit-driven, they could focus on long-term projects with high social returns.
Our study revisits the banking-growth nexus by focusing on savings banks in 978 Prussian cities. We found a positive and significant relationship between the establishment of savings banks and city growth, and the number of steam engines per factory in the nineteenth century (1854-75). Previous research has either studied the impact of savings banks at a highly aggregated level or qualitatively with case studies. This study is the first to provide quantitative evidence on the local impact of savings banks during the early nineteenth century.
To address potential endogeneity, we refer to a decree issued in 1854 by the Minister for Trade and Commerce. This decree enhanced the equal distribution of saving, because it demanded the founding of at least one savings bank per county. It further encouraged poorer local authorities to found a savings bank by offering institutional and financial support. Following this decree, a wave of savings banks were established on a much wider geographical distribution than before. In 1849, savings banks were present in about half of the counties; this had risen to nearly 95 per cent by 1864.
We also observed a significant pre-growth trend in earlier periods before the founding of a savings bank in a city. There is no such trend, however, after 1854 (Figure 1).The savings banks that were founded during this wave were often established in smaller cities that might not have been able to afford them without support. Thus, the decree can be seen as a public policy to promote the establishment of public financial infrastructure in remote regions.
Although we cannot perfectly solve the endogeneity issue, the regression results suggest that savings banks promoted city growth. This is even more plausible when considering that Germany’s industrialisation was not only based on larger, multinational firms and coal resources, but rather on good public infrastructure, a competitive schooling system, and, in particular, on small and medium-sized firms, which were the backbone of German industry. The resulting economic landscape persists today.
Our study contributes to the understanding of why Germany industrialised by analysing a neglected aspect of the relationship between banks and growth. Earlier research, which focussed on the impact of large universal banks and stock markets at the end of the 19th century, largely overlooking the impact of savings banks and the potential benefit of a decentralised financial system. The evidence that we provide clearly shows that there is a considerable gap in the literature on savings banks and how they actually contributed to economic growth.
This workshop intends to bring together military historians, international relations researchers, and economic historians, and aims to explore the financing of conventional and irregular warfare.
Martial funds originated from a variety of legitimate and illegitimate sources. The former includes direct provision by government or central banking activity. Private donations also need to be considered, as they have also proven a viable means of financing paramilitary activity. Illegitimate sources in the context of war refer to the ability of an occupying force to extract economic and monetary resources and include, for example, ‘patriotic hold-ups’ of financial institutions, and spoliation.
This workshop seeks to provide answers to three central questions. First, who paid for war? Second, how did belligerents finance war – by borrowing, or printing money? Finally, was there a juncture between resistance financing and the funding of conventional forces?
In the twentieth century, the global nature of conflict drastically altered existing power blocs and fostered ideologically motivated regimes. These changes were aided by improvements in mass communication technology, and a nascent corporatism that replaced the empire-building of the long nineteenth century.
What remained unchanged, however, was the need for money in the waging of war. Throughout history, success in war depended on financial support. With it, armies can be paid and fed; research can be encouraged; weapons can be bought, and ordnance shipped. Without it, troops, arms, and supplies become scarcer and more difficult to acquire. Many of these considerations are just as applicable to clandestine forces. Nonetheless, there is an obvious constraint for the latter: their activity takes place in secret. This engenders important operational differences compared to state-sanctioned warfare and generates its own specific problems.
Traditionally, banking operations are predicated on an absence of confidence between parties to a transaction. Banks are institutional participants who act as trusted intermediaries, but what substitute intermediaries exist if the banking system has failed? This was the quandary faced by members of the internal French resistance during the Second World War. Who could they trust to supply them regularly with funds? Where could they safely store their money, and who would change foreign currency into francs on their behalf?
Members of resistance groups could not acquire funds from the remnants of the French government while Marshal Pétain’s regime retained nominal control over the Non-Occupied Zone, nor could they obtain credit from the banking system. Instead, resistance forces came to depend on external donations which were either airdropped or handed over by agents working on behalf of the British, American and Free French secret services. The traditional role of the banking sector was supplanted by military agents; the few bankers involved in resistance activities acted more as moneychangers, rather than as issuers of credit.
Without funding, clandestine operatives were unable to purchase food from the black market, or to rent rooms. Wages were indeed paid to resistance members, but there were disparities between the different groups and no official pay-scale existed. Instead, leaders of the various groups decided on the salary range of their subordinates, which varied during the Second World War.
As liberation approached, a fifty-franc note, was produced on the orders of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (S.H.A.E.F.) in anticipation of being used within the Allied Military Government for Occupied Territories, in 1944, once the invasion of France was underway (Figure 1).
Clearly, there are many aspects of resistance financing, and the funding of conventional forces, that remain to be investigated. This workshop intends to facilitate ongoing discussions.
Due to the pandemic, this workshop will take place online on 13th November 2020. The keynote speech will be given via webinar and participants’ contributions will be uploaded before the event. To register for the event, click here
The workshop is financed by the ‘Initiatives & Conference Fund’ from the Economic History Society, a ‘Conference Organisation’ bursary from Royal Historical Society, and Oriel College, Oxford.
More information about the Economic History Society’s grants opportunities can be found here
By 1914, the Egyptian economy confronted a unique conundrum: its large agricultural sector was negatively hit by declining yields in cotton production, the main driver of the economy. Egypt was a textbook case of export-led development, because cotton production and exports had dominated the country’s economy. The decline in cotton yields, which came to be regarded as a “cotton crisis”, was coupled with two other constraints: land scarcity and high population density. Nonetheless, despite unfavourable price shocks, Egyptian agriculture was able to overcome this crisis in the interwar period. The output stagnation between 1900 and the 1920s contrasts with the following recovery (Figure 1).
Previous research documented that during the crisis the decline in yields was caused by expanded irrigation without sufficient drainage, which led to a higher water table and made cotton more prone to pest attacks (Radwan, 1974; Owen, 1968; Richards, 1982). This problem was addressed when the government introduced an extensive public works programme directed to drainage and irrigation. Simultaneously, Egypt’s farmers changed their cotton cultivation from the long staple and low- yielding Sakellaridis to the medium-short staple and high yielding Achmouni. This change reflected income maximizing preferences (Goldberg 2004 and 2006). Another important feature of the Egyptian economy between the 1920s and 1940s was the expansion of credit facilities to farmers. Cooperatives, and the Crèdit Agricole (1931) were established to facilitate small landowners’ access to inputs and small loans (Issawi, 1954, Eshag and Kamal, 1967). These credit institutions coexisted with a number of mortgage banks, among which the Credit Foncièr was the largest, servicing predominantly large owners. Figure 2 illustrates the average annual real value of Credit Foncièr land mortgages in 1,000 Egyptian pounds (1926-1939).
Our work investigates the extent to which these factors contributed to the recovery of the cotton sector. Specifically: to what extent can intra-cotton shifts explain changes in total output? How did the increase in public works boost production? And, what role did differential access to credit play? To answer these questions, we construct a new dataset by exploiting official statistics (Annuaire Statistique de l’Egypte) covering 11 provinces and 17 years between 1923 and 1939.
We find that access to both finance and improved seeds significantly increased cotton output, and the declining price premium of Sakellaridis led to a large scale switch to Achmouni. By putting farmers’ choices and agency centre stage in our analysis, our study shows that cultivators’ response to market changes was fundamental to the recovery of the cotton sector. Access to credit was also a strong determinant of cotton output, and productivity-enhancing innovations in agriculture (Glaeser, 2010).
Surprisingly, perhaps, our results show that the expansion of irrigation and drainage did not have a direct effect on output (in the same or following year). However, we cannot completely rule out the role played by improved irrigation infrastructure for two reasons: first, we do not observe investments in private drains, and thus we cannot empirically assess the potential complementarities between private and public drainage. Second, we find some evidence pointing to the cumulative effect of drainage pipes, two and three years after installation.
We also find that the structure of land ownership, specifically the presence of large landowners, contributed to output recovery. Thus, despite the attempted institutional innovations aimed at giving small farmers better access to credit, large landowners benefitted disproportionally from credit availability. This observation accords with Egypt’s extreme inequality of land holdings.
Glaeser, B. The Green Revolution Revisited: Critique and Alternatives. Taylor & Francis, 2010.
Goldberg, E. “Historiography of Crisis in the Egyptian Political Economy.” In Middle Eastern Historiographies: Narrating the Twentieth Century, edited by I. Gershoni, Amy Singer, and Hakan Erdem, 183–207. University of Washington Press, 2006.
———. Trade, Reputation and Child Labour in the Twentieth-Century Egypt. Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
Issawi, C. Egypt at Mid-Century. Oxford University Press, 1954.
Owen, R. “Agricultural Production in Historical Perspective: A Case Study of the Period 1890-1939.” In Egypt Since the Revolution, edited by P. Vatikiotis, 40–65, 1968.
Radwan, S. Capital Formation in Egyptian Industry and Agriculture, 1882-1967. Ithaca Press, 1974.
Richards, A. Egypt’s Agricultural Development, 1800-1980: Technical and Social Change. Westview Press, 1982.
This piece is the result of a collaboration between the Economic History Review, the Journal of Economic History, Explorations in Economic History and the European Review of Economic History. More details and special thanks below. Part A is available at this link
As the world grapples with a pandemic, informed views based on facts and evidence have become all the more important. Economic history is a uniquely well-suited discipline to provide insights into the costs and consequences of rare events, such as pandemics, as it combines the tools of an economist with the long perspective and attention to context of historians. The editors of the main journals in economic history have thus gathered a selection of the recently-published articles on epidemics, disease and public health, generously made available by publishers to the public, free of access, so that we may continue to learn from the decisions of humans and policy makers confronting earlier episodes of widespread disease and pandemics.
Generations of economic historians have studied disease and its impact on societies across history. However, as the discipline has continued to evolve with improvements in both data and methods, researchers have uncovered new evidence about episodes from the distant past, such as the Black Death, as well as more recent global pandemics, such as the Spanish Influenza of 1918. In this second instalment of The Long View on Epidemics, Disease and Public Health: Research from Economic History, the editors present a review of two major themes that have featured in the analysis of disease. The first includes articles that discuss the economic impacts of historical epidemics and the official responses they prompted. The second turns to the more optimistic story of the impact of public health regulation and interventions, and the benefits thereby generated.
The availability of coal is central to debates about the causes of the Industrial Revolution and modern economic growth in Europe. To overcome regional limitations in supply, it has been argued that coal could have been transported. However, despite references to the import option and transport costs, the evolution of coal markets in nineteenth-century Europe has received limited attention. Interest in the extent of markets is motivated by their effects on economic growth and welfare ( Federico 2019; Lampe and Sharp 2019).
The literature on market integration in nineteenth-century Europe mostly refers to grain prices, usually wheat. Our paper extends the research to coal, a key commodity. The historical literature of coal market integration is scant—in contrast to the literature for more recent times (Wårell 2006; Li et al. 2010; Papież and Śmiech 2015). Previous historical studies usually report some price differences between- and within countries, while a few provide statistical analyses, often applied to a narrow geographical scope.
We examine intra- and international market integration in the principal coal producing countries, Britain, Germany, France and Belgium. Our analysis includes three, largely non-producing, Southern European countries, Italy, Spain and Portugal—for which necessary data are available. (Other countries were considered but ultimately not included). We have created a database of (annual) European coal prices at different spatial levels.
Based on our price data, we consider prices in the main consumer cities and producing regions and estimate specific price differentials between areas in which the coal trade was well established. As a robustness check, we estimate trends in the coefficient of variation for a large number of markets. For the international market, we estimate price differentials between proven trading markets. Given available data, focus on Europe’ main exporter, Britain, and the main import countries – France, Germany, and Southern Europe. To confirm findings, we estimate the coefficient of variation of prices throughout coal producing Europe.
To estimate market integration within coal producing countries, we utilise Federico’s (2012) proposal for testing both price convergence and efficiency—the latter referring to a quick return to equilibrium after a shock. For the international market, we again estimate convergence equations. For selected international routes, and according to the available information, we complete the analysis with an econometric model on the determinants of integration—which includes the ‘second wave’ of research in market integration (Federico 2019). Finally, to verify our findings, we apply a variance analysis to prices for the producing countries.
Our results, based on quantitative and qualitative evidence, may be summarized as follows. First, within coal-producing countries, we find evidence of price convergence. Second, markets became more ‘efficient’ over time – suggesting reductions in information costs. Nevertheless, coal prices were subject to strong fluctuations and shocks, in relation to ‘coal famines’. Compared to agricultural produce, the process of integration in coal appears to have taken longer. However, price convergence in coal tended to stabilize at the end of our period, suggesting insignificant further reduction in transports costs and the existence of product heterogeneity. Finally, our evidence indicates that cartelization in Continental Europe from the late nineteenth century had limited impact on price convergence.
Turning to the international coal market, our econometric results confirm price convergence between Britain and importing countries. Like domestic markets, the speed with which price differentials between Britain and Continental Europe were eroded declined from the 1900s. Further, market integration between Britain and Continental Europe appears to have been largely influenced by changes in transportation costs, information costs and protectionism. Extending our analysis to other countries, (with, admittedly, limited data) suggests that price convergence started later in our period. Finally, our results indicate the limited ability of cartels to restrict competition beyond their most immediate area of influence.
Overall, we observe integration in both the domestic and international coal market. Future research might consider expanding the focus to other cross-country, Continental, markets to acquire a deeper comprehension of the causes and effects of market integration.
by Elizaveta Blagodeteleva (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
This research will be presented during the EHS Annual Conference in Belfast, April 5th – 7th 2019. Conference registration can be found on the EHS website.
In autumn of 1916, a big scandal roiled the Moscow public: local landlords petitioned the municipal government for the permission to raise rents, which was prohibited by the military administration a year before amid the escalating refugee crisis. Newspapers fumed at the selfishness of the rich, who not only avoided serving their country at the battlefield but exploited wartime hardships to get even richer. Health inspectors, lessees and workers of the largest industrial plants publicly raised their objections to the proposal.
Although the concerted effort of the city landlords to increase revenue eventually failed, the public outrage persisted. The occasional evidence of huge war profits and rumours about the luxurious life of industrialists and rentiers stoked anger among the urbanites, who struggled to make ends meet under the increasing pressure of galloping inflation and food shortages. The rent scandal highlighted the growing animosity towards the rich that the Bolsheviks would later channel into fully-fledged class warfare.
In 1916, Moscow residents sincerely believed that the gap between the wealthy and the rest of the population was enormous and it kept widening at an alarming pace. But did their beliefs match reality? In other words, how unequal was urban society in Russia in the last year of the old regime? To answer this question, a student of social and economic inequality would usually refer to income tax records. Unfortunately, there are very few of them in case of imperial Russia.
The Russian authorities had been extremely wary of income taxation up until the beginning of the Great War, when the national political mobilisation elevated the issue of the personal responsibility of each and every subject of the tsar. As a result, the state legislature passed an income tax in the spring of 1916. Its political objectives overwhelmed fiscal practicalities as lawmakers wanted it to bring the state closer to the ‘pockets’ and ‘hearts’ of the people. The progressivity of the new tax was supposed to ensure the levelling of the great fortunes and make the body politic more cohesive.
Since tax collection began in March 1917 and continued through the period of an intense power struggle and regime change, surviving records are patchy. Neither the tsar’s local treasures nor early Soviet fiscal authorities left comprehensive accounts of the sums collected in 1917. Nevertheless, Moscow archives have preserved some tax rolls that document the personal incomes for the year 1916, reported by taxpayers and then ascertained by tax collectors in the first half of 1917.
The records allow a tentative reconstruction of the level of income inequality in the city. Given that the adult population of Moscow amounted to 1.1 million in the spring of 1917, the estimates show that the wealthiest 1% and 5% must have received and then reported about 45.9% and 58.8% of their total income. With the Gini coefficient standing at 0.75, those shares display an extremely high level of income inequality among the city residents in 1916. A huge gap between the rich and the others not only felt real but was real.
Liquidity is the ease with which an asset such as a share or a bond can be converted into cash. It is important for financial systems because it enables investors to liquidate and diversify their assets at a low cost. Without liquid markets, portfolio diversification becomes very costly for the investor. As a result, firms and governments must pay a premium to induce investors to buy their bonds and shares. Liquid capital markets also spur firms and entrepreneurs to invest in long-run projects, which increases productivity and economic growth.
From an historical perspective, share liquidity in the UK played a major role in the widespread adoption of the company form in the second half of the nineteenth century. Famously, as I discuss in a recent book chapter published in the Research Handbook on the History of Corporate and Company Law, political and legal opposition to share liquidity held up the development of the company form in the UK.
However, given the economic and historical importance of liquidity, very little has been written on the liquidity of UK capital markets before 1913. Ron Alquist (2010) and Matthieu Chavaz and Marc Flandreau (2017) examine the liquidity risk and premia of various sovereign bonds which were traded on the London Stock Exchange during the late Victorian and early Edwardian eras. Along with Graeme Acheson (2008), I document the thinness of the market for bank shares in the nineteenth century, using the share trading records of a small number of banks.
In a major study, Gareth Campbell (Queen’s University Belfast), Qing Ye (Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University) and I have recently attempted to understand more about the liquidity of the Victorian capital market. To this end, we have just published a paper in the Economic History Review which looks at the liquidity of the London share and bond markets from 1825 to 1870. The London capital market experienced considerable growth in this era. The liberalisation of incorporation law and Parliament’s liberalism in granting company status to railways and other public-good providers, resulted in the growth of the number of business enterprises having their shares and bonds traded on stock exchanges. In addition, from the 1850s onwards, there was an increase in the number of foreign countries and companies raising bond finance on the London market.
How do we measure the liquidity of the market for bonds and stocks in the 1825-70 era? Using end-of-month stock price data from a stockbroker list called the Course of the Exchange and end-of-month bond prices from newspaper sources, we calculate for each security, the number of months in the year where it had a zero return and divide that by the number of months it was listed in the year. Because zero returns are indicative of illiquidity (i.e., that a security has not been traded), one minus our illiquidity ratio gives us a liquidity measure for each security in our sample. We calculate the overall market liquidity for shares and bonds by taking averages. Figure 1 displays market liquidity for bonds and stocks for the period 1825-70.
Figure 1 reveals that bond market liquidity was relatively high throughout this period but shows no strong trend over time. By way of contrast, there was a strong secular increase in stock liquidity from 1830 to 1870. This increase may have stimulated greater participation in the stock market by ordinary citizens. It may also have affected the growth and deepening of the overall stock market and resulted in higher economic growth.
We examine the cross-sectional differences in liquidity between stocks in order to understand the main determinants of stock liquidity in this era. Our main finding in this regard is that firm size and the number of issued shares were major correlates of liquidity, which suggests that larger firms and firms with a greater number of shares were more frequently traded. Our study also reveals that unusual features which were believed to impede liquidity, such as extended liability, uncalled capital or high share denominations, had little effect on stock liquidity.
We also examine whether asset illiquidity was priced by investors, resulting in higher costs of capital for firms and governments. We find little evidence that the illiquidity of stock or bonds was priced, suggesting that investors at the time did not put much emphasis on liquidity in their valuations. Indeed, this is consistent with J. B. Jefferys (1938), who argued that what mattered to investors during this era was not share liquidity, but the dividend or coupon they received.
In conclusion, the vast majority of stocks and bonds in this early capital market were illiquid. It is remarkable, however, that despite this illiquidity, the UK capital market grew substantially between 1825 and 1870. There was also an increase in investor participation, with investing becoming progressively democratised in this era.
Acheson, G.G., and Turner, J.D. “The Secondary Market for Bank Shares in Nineteenth-Century Britain.” Financial History Review 15, no. 2 (October 2008): 123–51. doi:10.1017/S0968565008000139.
Alquist, R. “How Important Is Liquidity Risk for Sovereign Bond Risk Premia? Evidence from the London Stock Exchange.” Journal of International Economics 82, no. 2 (November 1, 2010): 219–29. doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2010.07.007.
Campbell, G., Turner, J.D., and Ye, Q. “The Liquidity of the London Capital Markets, 1825–70†.” The Economic History Review 71, no. 3 (August 1, 2018): 823–52. doi:10.1111/ehr.12530.
Chavaz, M., and Flandreau, M. “‘High & Dry’: The Liquidity and Credit of Colonial and Foreign Government Debt and the London Stock Exchange (1880–1910).” The Journal of Economic History 77, no. 3 (September 2017): 653–91. doi:10.1017/S0022050717000730.
Jefferys, J.B. Trends in Business Organisation in Great Britain Since 1856: With Special Reference to the Financial Structure of Companies, the Mechanism of Investment and the Relations Between the Shareholder and the Company. University of London, 1938.