How the Bank of England managed the financial crisis of 1847

by Kilian Rieder (University of Oxford)

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New Branch Bank of England, Manchester, antique print, 1847. Available at <https://www.antiquemapsandprints.com/lancs-new-branch-bank-of-england-manchester-antique-print-1847-101568-p.asp&gt;

What drives a central bank’s decision to grant or refuse liquidity provision during a financial crisis? How does the central bank manage counterparty risk during such periods of high demand for liquidity, when time constraints make it hard to process all relevant information? How does a central bank juggle the provision of large amounts of liquidity with its monetary policy obligations?

All of these questions were live issues for the Bank of England during the financial crisis of 1847 just as they would be in 2007. My research uses archival data to shed light on these questions by looking at the Bank’s discount window policies in the crisis year of 1847.

The Bank had to manage the 1847 financial crisis despite being limited by a legal monetary policy provision in the Act to back any expansion of its note issue with gold. It is often cited as the last episode of financial distress during which the Bank rationed central bank liquidity before fully assuming its role as a lender of last resort (Bignon et al, 2012).

We find that the Bank did not engage in any kind of simple threshold rationing but rather monitored and managed its private sector asset holdings in similar ways to central banks have developed since the financial crisis of 2007. In another echo of the recent crisis, the Bank of England also required an indemnity from the UK government in 1847 allowing the Bank to supply more liquidity than it was legally allowed. This indemnity became part of the ‘reaction function’ in future financial crises.

Most importantly, the year 1847 witnessed the introduction of a sophisticated discount ledger system at the Bank. The Bank used the ledger system to record systematically its day-to-day transactions with key counterparties. Discount loan applicants submitted bills in parcels, sometimes containing a hundred or more, which the Bank would have to analyse collectively ‘on the fly’.

The Bank would reject those it didn’t like and then discount the remainder, typically charging a single interest rate. Subsequently, the parcels were ‘unpacked’ into individual bills in the separate customer ‘with and upon ledgers’ where they were classified under the name of their discounter and acceptor alongside several other characteristics at the bill level (drawer, place of origin, maturity, amount, etc.). By analysing these bills and their characteristics we are better able to understanding the Bank’s discount window policies.

We first find evidence that during crisis weeks the Bank was more likely to reject demands for credit from bill brokers – the money market mutual funds of their time – while favouring a small group of regular large discounters. Equally, firms associated with the commercial crisis and the corn price speculation in 1847 (many of which subsequently failed) were less likely to obtain central bank credit. The Bank was discerning about whom it lent to and the discount window was not entirely ‘frosted’ as suggested by Capie (2001).

But our findings support Capie’s main hypothesis that the decision whether to accept or reject a bill depended largely on individual bill characteristics. The Bank appeared to use a set of rules to decide on this, which it applied consistently in both crisis weeks and non-crisis weeks. Most ‘collateral characteristics’ – inter alia, the quality of the names endorsing a bill – were highly significant factors driving the Bank’s decision to reject.

This finding supports the idea that the Bank needed to be active in monitoring key counterparties in the financial system well before formal methods of supervision in the twentieth century, echoing results obtained by Flandreau and Ugolini (2011) for the later 1866 crisis.

 

Delusions of competence: the near-death of Lloyd’s of London 1980-2002

by Robin Pearson (University of Hull) 
This paper was presented at the EHS Annual Conference 2019 in Belfast. 

Lloyds-of-London
Rapid structural change resulting from system collapse seems to be a less common phenomenon in insurance than in the history of other financial services. One notably exception is the crisis that rocked Lloyd’s of London, the world’s oldest continuous insurance market, in the late twentieth century. 

Hitherto, explanations for the crisis have focused on catastrophic losses and problems of internal governance. My study argues that while these factors were important, they may not have resulted in institutional collapse had it not been for multiple delusions of competence among the various parties involved. 

Lloyd’s was a self-governing market that comprised investors – known as names – who put up their personal assets to back the insurance written on their behalf, and accepted unlimited individual liability for losses. Names were organised into syndicates led by an underwriter and a managing agency. Business could only be brought to syndicates by brokers licensed by Lloyd’s. Large broking firms owned most of the managing agencies and thereby controlled the syndicates, giving rise to serious conflicts of interest.  

 In 1970, Lloyd’s resolved to expand capacity by lowering property qualifications for new names. As a result, the membership exploded from 6,000 to over 32,000 by 1988. Many new names were less well-heeled than their predecessors and largely ignorant of the insurance business. Despite a series of scandals involving underwriters siphoning off syndicate funds for their own personal use, the number of entrants kept rising thanks to double digit investment returnsthe tax advantages of membership, and aggressive recruiting.  

While capacity was increasing, underwriters competed vigorously to write long-tail liability and catastrophe business in the form of excess loss (XL) reinsurance. Under these contracts, the reinsurer agreed to indemnify the reinsured in the event of the latter sustaining a loss in excess of a pre-determined figure. The reinsurer in turn usually retroceded (laid off) some of the amount reinsured to another insurer. 

Many Lloyd’s underwriters went into this market despite having little experience of the business. Some syndicates doing XL reinsurance retroceded to other XL syndicates, so that instead of the risks being dispersed, they circulated around the same market, becoming increasingly opaque and concentrated in a few syndicates. This became the infamous London Market Excess of Loss (LMX) spiral. 

By 1990, over one quarter of business at Lloyd’s was XL reinsurance. The spiral offered brokers, underwriters and managing agents the opportunity to earn commission and fees on every reinsurance and retrocession written. 

It also enabled underwriters to arbitrage the differential between the premiums they charged for the original insurance, and the lower premiums they paid for reinsurance and retrocessionsA later inquiry also showed that those writing at the top of the spiral accepted, out of ignorance or carelessness, premium rates that were far too low for the higher layers, in the belief that these were virtually risk-free.  

Unscrupulous underwriters could also offload the worst risks onto ‘dustbin’ syndicates of outsider names, while picking the best risks to be reinsured with so-called ‘baby’ syndicates of insiders. Poor information recording made it difficult to track the risks insured in the LMX spiral. 

Lloyd’s membership peaked in 1988, which also marked the first of five years of unprecedented losses. ‘Long-tail risks on liability insurance generated many of the losses, as well as a series of storms, earthquakes, hurricanes, oil industry disasters and the Gulf war. Asbestosis and industrial pollution claims in the United States poured in, some from policies dating as far back as the 1930s. 

The tsunami of claims overwhelmed Lloyd’s. Groups of names resisted calls and sued on the grounds that Lloyd’s market supervision had failed. Most political opinion moved towards accepting the need for fundamental reform, despite a fierce rearguard action from traditionalists.  

In 1993, for the first time in its history, Lloyd’s permitted the entry of corporate investors with limited liability, and these soon accounted for 80% of market capacity. The number of individual names collapsed. A vehicle was created – Equitas – to reinsure all liabilities incurred prior to 1993, funded by a levy on members. 

In 1996, Lloyd’s achieved a £3.1 billion settlement with its litigants. In 1998, the new Labour government announced that Lloyd’s would be independently regulated by the Financial Services Authority 

Studies of decision-making under uncertainty and the fallacies of experts are helpful in explaining behaviour at Lloyd’s revealed by the crisiswhich included arrogance, elitism, greed, corruption and stubborn resistance to reform in defence of vested interestsPolitically entrenched ideas about the virtues of self-regulation, and an exaggerated faith in the ability of insider experts to know what was best for the institution, also played a role. 

The practice of syndicate underwriters ‘following’ the premium rate set by a recognised ‘lead’ underwriter reinforced behavioural traits such as herding, the desire to avoid being an outlier in one’s predictions; ‘cognitive dissonance’, the inability to know the limits of one’s expertise; overconfidence and optimistic bias. 

The combined effect of these behaviours on XL underwriting at Lloyd’s was a heightened tendency to ignore ‘black swans’, the unknown or unimagined events that can deliver catastrophic losses. There are obvious parallels with the behaviour of investors in the market for sub-prime mortgage default risk, the collapse of which brought about the global financial crisis of 2007/08. 

 

Managing the Economy, Managing the People: narratives of economic life in Britain from Beveridge to Brexit

by Jim Tomlinson (University of Glasgow)

 

book‘It’s the economy stupid’, like most clichés, both reveals and conceals important truths. The slogan suggests a hugely important truth about the post-1945 politics of the advanced democracies such as Britain: that economic  issues have been crucial to government strategies and political arguments. What the cliché conceals is the need to examine what is understood by ‘the economy’, a term which has no fixed meaning, and has been constantly re-worked over the years. Starting from those two points, this book provides a distinctive new account of British economic life since the 1940s, focussing upon how successive governments, in seeking to manage the economy, have sought simultaneously to ‘manage the people’: to try and manage popular understanding of economic issues.

The first half the book analyses the development of the major narratives from the 1940s onwards. This  covers the notion of ‘austerity’ and its particular meaning in the 1940s; the rise of a narrative of ‘economic decline’ from the late 1950s, and the subsequent attempts to ‘modernize’ the economy; the attempts to ‘roll back the state’ from the 1970s; the impact of ideas of ‘globalization’ in the 1900s; and, finally, the way the crisis of 2008/9 onwards was constructed as a problem of ‘debts and deficits’. The second part focuses in on four key issues in attempts to ‘manage the people’: productivity, the balance of payments, inflation and unemployment. It shows how in each case  governments sought to get the populace to understand these issues in a particular light, and shaped strategies to that end.

One conclusion of the book is the grounding of most representations of key economic problems of the post-war period in Britain as an industrial economy, and how de-industrialization undermines this representation.  Unemployment, from its origins in the late-Victorian period, was largely about the malfunctioning of  industrial (and male) labour markets. De-industrialization, accompanied by the proliferation of precarious work, including much classified as ‘self-employment’, radically challenges our understanding of  this problem, however much it remains the case that for the great bulk of the population selling their labour is key to their economic prosperity.

The concern with productivity was likewise grounded in the industrial sector. But outside the marketed services, in non-marketed provision like education, health and care, the problems of conceptualising, let alone measuring, productivity are immense. In a world where personal services of various kinds are becoming ever more important, traditional notions of productivity need a radical re-think.

Less obviously, the notion of a national rate of inflation, such as the Cost of Living Index and later the RPI, was grounded in attempts to measure the real wages of the industrial working class. With the value of housing as key underpinning for consumption, and the ‘financialization’ of the economy, this traditional notion of inflation, measuring the cost of a basket of consumables against nominal wages, has been undermined. Asset, especially housing, prices matter much more to many wage earners, whilst the value of financial assets is also important to increasing numbers of people as the population ages.

Finally, the decline of concern with the balance of payments is linked to the rise in the relative importance of financial flows, making  the manufacturing balance or the current account less pertinent. For many years now Britain’s external payments have relied on the rates of return on overseas assets, exceeding those on domestic assets held by foreigners. We are a very long way indeed from 1940s stories of ‘England’s bread hangs by Lancashire’s thread’.

De-industrialization has not only undercut the coherence and relevance of the four standard economic policy problems of the post-war years, but has also destroyed the primary audience that most post-war economic propaganda was aimed at: the industrial working class. While other audiences were not entirely neglected, it was the worker (usually the male worker), who was the prime target of the narratives and whose understandings and behaviour were seen as the key to the projected solutions.

A recurrent anxiety of this propaganda was the receptivity of those workers to its messages. This anxiety helps to explain much of the ‘simplified’ language of this propaganda, as well as its patterns of distribution. More fundamentally, this anxiety rested upon uncertainties about what kind of arguments would a working-class audience find congenial; there was perennial debate about the efficacy of appeals to individual as opposed to the ‘national’ interest. Above all, there was a moral message of distributive justice which infused much of the propaganda, ultimately grounded in the belief that working class culture had within it ingrained notions of  ‘fairness’ that had to be appealed to.

While ethical appeals continued to inform economic propaganda into the twenty-first century, the fragmentation of the old audience accelerated. In addition, given the upward lurch in inequality in the 1980s, and the following period of continuing growth of incomes right at the top of the distribution, appeals to ‘fairness’ have become much more difficult to make credible. Strikingly, concerns about inequality emerged across the political spectrum after the 2007/8 financial crisis, at the same time as the narrative of debts, deficits and austerity had driven post-crisis policies that increased  inequality. Widespread talk of ‘reducing inequality’, whilst having obvious political appeal, especially after Brexit, would seem to be largely rhetorical.

 

Managing the Economy, Managing the People: narratives of economic life in Britain from Beveridge to Brexit is edited by Oxford University Press, 2017,  ISBN 978-019-878609-2

To contact the author: Jim.Tomlinson@Glasgow.ac.uk

EHS 2018 special: Long-term effects of financial crises

by Chenzi Xu (Harvard University)

 

The global financial crisis of 2008 was not unique. It had a precedent in the London banking crisis of 1866. Just as in 2008, the crisis began in the core financial market and spread to the periphery, the same happened in 1866.

The 1866 crisis has only been studied as a purely British event, but my research presents new evidence that it was a global financial crisis on the scale of 2008’s. The cities around the world that depended on British banks that happened to fail in London suffered immediate losses in exports activity. These losses took decades to recover, with the hysteresis persisting until the twentieth century.

In May 1866, Overend and Gurney, a bank’s bank and one of the most prestigious financial entities in London, declared bankruptcy. A panic erupted and almost 20% of banks headquartered in London failed. Crucially, these banks had been established in the mid-nineteenth century to globalise financial markets and trade, and they operated in cities around the world.

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Figure 1. Map of British credits and failures around the world

 

Figure 1 shows the concentration of British banking, and the degree to which the banking crisis in London affected them. Red denotes greater losses in British financing, and the size of the circles denotes the amount of lending before the crisis.

I study the impacts of the failures of British banks in London on trade activity around the world, outside of the UK, at hundreds of ports. At the extreme, losing access to all British credit caused exports to drop 80% in the year following the crisis. The aggregate global loss in trade was 17%, which is comparable to the levels seen in the latest crisis. Given that the mid-late 19th century was otherwise a period of great expansion and growth, the counterfactual without this crisis would have been even more spectacular.

The historical context also makes it possible to study the long-run effects, and I find that countries suffering the largest drops in the supply of British credit did not recover their exports to previous partners for several decades. These persistent effects suggest that losing access to financial markets can cause substantial hysteresis.

These long-term consequences of financial market instability have yet to be established for recent crises simply because not enough time has passed. But early evidence suggests that international trade has not rebounded, even ten years after the financial crisis.

Do the rules of the game matter? Monetary regimes and financial stability since 1920

by German Forero-Laverde (Universidad Externado de Colombia / Universitat de Barcelona)

Financial crises come in many shapes and forms. They can occur in stock markets, private or public debt markets, housing markets or any asset class you may think of (yes, even tulips). Attempts to predict the timing and asset class where the next crisis will show its ugly head have been unsuccessful in part due to the amount and diversity of forces at play. The veil of uncertainty that surrounds them and the negative effect they have on long-run economic growth makes the study of crises both pertinent and challenging.

The research, presented at the 2017 EHS annual conference, studies one possible factor that may be related to the frequency and intensity of booms and busts in stock and credit markets: the rules of the game. It studies the possibility that the monetary regime, competing decisions on monetary policy, exchange rates and capital flows, is related to the evolution of financial aggregates to different time horizons. The underlying idea, following the Bank for International Settlements, is that different regimes endow the financial system with varying levels of elasticity, allowing for imbalances to accumulate in the form of booms and unwind in the form of crises at different rates and intensity.

This is a stepping stone in the road to answer a question that has troubled policy makers for over a century: Should authorities and regulators intervene in the market trying to anticipate crisis, or is the best course of action to react once crises ensue? If regimes do play a role, and the channels of accumulation of imbalances are contingent on the institutions at play, it is possible that authorities may have a wider array of tools at their disposal to avoid the accumulation of financial stability.

In order to do it, the research proposes three new measures for the evolution of the stock market and credit aggregates since 1922 until today for France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. The new measures, the Boom Bust Indicators – BBIs, result from a variation on our earlier work, and allow us to characterize booms and busts depending on their effects to different horizons: explosive ones affect the short-run (up to one year); expansive ones have an effect up to the third year; and pervasive ones show effects after 5 years.

BBIs complement what has been traditionally done in the financial crisis literature. They depart from decomposition techniques such as spectral analysis in that they use all the information in the original series instead of extracting a part of the data. They depart from turning point analysis and other crises dating techniques since the outcome is a triplet of continuous series instead of a summary sequence of dates for booms and crashes. They complement measures like the severity index which pays unduly little attention to explosive booms and busts to the benefit of lengthier events. Finally, the measures allows for comparisons across countries and time. A sample of the three measures for the UK stock market is presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Boom Bust Indicator for the UK stock market 1922-2015

Forero-Laverde - Figure 1

The research studies the evolution of BBIs for credit and stock markets under five different regimes: the gold exchange standard (GES), the fixed peg rate of Bretton Woods (PEG), the managed float of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (MF), the periods of free floatation (FF) and the European Monetary Union (EMU). To characterize the differences in behavior under each regime we pool all countries together and measure the statistically significant differences in means and volatility for BBIs under each regime. They were graphed in a scatter plot, where the X axis represents volatility and the Y axis represents the mean. Results for the long-run measure are presented in Figure 2. The farther a regime appears from the origin, the more elastic it is as it coincides with stronger variability in the indicator.

Figure 2: Regimes according to mean value and volatility of long-run BBIs

Forero-Laverde - Figure 2

Although the mechanisms through which the regime impinges on the boom-bust cycle of credit and stocks still remains unclear, it is possible to highlight several findings. First, there is a role for the monetary regime on the evolution of asset prices and credit. Second, some sort of currency peg, with commitments to exchange rate stability and capital controls, favors financial stability both in the short and long run. However, stricter pegs are favorable for controlling stock market booms but increase both short run and medium run volatility of credit growth. Finally, a nominal anchor of the currency, through the gold exchange standard or the European Monetary Union, appears to be insufficient in generating financial stability as they coincide with booms and heightened volatility in stock and credit markets.

Contacts
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